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I.

INTRODUCTION

As has been stated in the earlier briefing on appeal, this case anses from the
condemnation and physical appropriation of a strip of real property formerly owned by Appellant
HI Boise, LLC ("HI Boise") by Respondent State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("lTD"),
in conjunction with its Vista Avenue Interchange project ("the Project"). (R. at p. 000239.) The
strip of land taken by lTD was a portion of a larger parcel that is improved by a hotel, restaurant
and convention center ("the Property").

(R. at p. 000666.)

The Project's design included

widening Vista Avenue in Boise, Idaho, near the freeway interchange with Interstate 84 ("1-84").
(R. at p. 000551.) Additionally, the newly constructed overpass is approximately fourteen (14)
feet taller than the prior overpass, requiring an elongated grade along Vista Avenue and therefore
increasing the height of Vista Avenue adjacent to HI Boise's property, including the property
taken from HI Boise in this action. (R. at p. 000550.)
Prior to the Project, HI Boise enjoyed a right to access Vista Avenue by way of an
express easement reservation contained within two deeds, both granted in 1967.

(R. at p.

000592.) Since that time, HI Boise and lTD (and their respective predecessors) have mutually
consented to and/or conducted themselves in a manner consistent with mutual consent to the
placement of the Property's access point at a specific location along Vista Avenue. (R. at p.
000593.) No party has presented any evidence that the Property's access point to Vista Avenue
was anything but the product of mutual consent and/or acquiescence, and the Property has
enjoyed the same access for roughly forty (40) years. (R. at p. 001793-1796.) As a result of the
Project, however, that long-established access right has been entirely usurped by the widening of
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Vista Avenue, and lTD has not provided a similar right of access along the newly-modified Vista
Avenue. (R. at p. 000683.) The district court has reserved for trial the question of whether HI
Boise's deeded access rights were taken in conjunction with the Project, and that issue is
therefore not ripe for appeal at this stage. (R. at pp. 001202.) Thereafter, however, the district
court adopted the reasoning of case law dealing with regulatory, not physical takings, ultimately
ruling that damages associated with lost access are only compensable if vehicular access is
"destroyed." (R. at p. 001204 (citing Merritt v. State, 113 Idaho 142, 145, 742 P.2d 397, 400
(1987».)
Finally, HI Boise contends that it has suffered damages associated with a loss of visibility
from the adjoining roadways. (R. at p. 000552.) Due to the substantial increase in the "size,
mass, and elevation" of the entire Project, of which the property taken from HI Boise is an
integral and necessary part, the HI Boise Property is now in a "'hole' that no other surrounding
properties experience." (R. at pp. 001533-1534.) Recognizing that the issue was one of first
impression in Idaho, the district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of lTD, thereby
denying HI Boise the ability to claim any damages - business, severance, or otherwise
resulting from the loss of visibility to the general public. (R. at pp. 001975-1977.)
The key issues in this appeal center around the proper application of two differing
precedents - State ex reI. Moore v. Bastian, 97 Idaho 444, 546 P.2d 399 (1976), and State ex reI.

Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269, 328 P.2d 60 (1958)

to the facts of this physical takings case.

Because the issue discussed in Bastian concerned solely a regulatory taking, HI Boise contends
that the Bastian precedent, while good law in terms of regulatory takings, is inapplicable in the
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instant case. Rather, the rule of law established by Fonburg, which consistent with Idaho Code §
7-711(2) mandates damages for "all inconveniences resulting to the owner's remaining land ...
which decrease the value of the land retained by the owner," should be followed. HI Boise
should therefore entitled to present evidence of damages resulting from reduced access rights to
its property, lost convenience of access to the property, and reduced visibility - each of which
decrease the value of the land that has been retained by HI Boise.
II. ARGUMENT
A.

Applicable Law.
1.

This Court should adhere to the guidance of Covington v. Jefferson
County.

As set forth in HI Boise's openmg brief, Idaho law mandates that a distinction be
maintained between issues dealing with physical takings, and those dealing with regulatory
takings. Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 777, 53 .P.3d 828 (2002). Strict precedent
exists prohibiting the application of precedent dealing with regulatory takings on issues of
physical takings, and vice versa. Id. at 781. The policy is not limited to Idaho, however, as it
derives from United States Supreme Court precedent interpreting the United States Constitution.

Id. (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg 'I Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 122
S.Ct. 1465 (2002»; see also U.S. Const. amend. V. Because, as will be addressed more fully
below, Bastian established precedent applicable only to disputes involving regulatory takings,

Covington requires that Bastian be set aside for purposes of this physical taking case. Id.
lTD's only discussion of the prohibition set forth in Covington appears in a two-sentence
paragraph on page 25 of its brief, where lTD argues that "nothing in either Covington or Tahoe-
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Sierra suggests that a particular form of damage cannot be barred in both physical and regulatory
taking cases." (lTD Brief, p. 25.) The problem with that incomplete analysis is that lTD has yet
to come forth with any legal authority, other than authority addressing non-physical, regulatory
takings, which would supports a bar of HI Boise's claimed damages.

Because there is no

authority addressing physical takings that supports lTD's intended limitation of damages in this
case, Covington requires that the Court reject the rules of law set forth in those regulatory takings
cases in favor of applicable statutory and common law precedent regarding partial physical
takings.
2.

The Bastian decision should be limited to analysis of regulatory
takings.

In its attempts to justify its reliance on Bastian in this physical takings case, lTD asserts
that "Bastian involved both a physical taking and a claim by the property owner for changes
based on changes in traffic flow." (lTD's Brief, p. 24.) "This," ITD concludes, "is precisely the
situation here." (Id.) However, that overview of the Bastian decision is overly simplistic and
does not properly assign this Court's rulings to the respective issues involved.

In order to

properly evaluate the scope and applicability of Bastian, HI Boise contends that it is necessary to
first consider the issues addressed within the pm1s of the case relied upon by lTD.
It is true that the underlying facts of Bastian included both a physical and a regulatory

take. 97 Idaho at 446. With respect to the physical invasion of the Bastians' property, there was
"no dispute but that the State is required to pay just compensation not only for the value of the
strip of land actually taken, but is also required to compensate for damages, if any, which that
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severance will cause to the remainder portion of the property." Id. (citing Idaho Const. Art. I, §
14 and I.C. § 7-711. However, in addition to claims for damages arising from the physical
appropriation of the private property, the defendants "also sought damages for the depreciation in
the value of the remainder land by reason of expected traffic diversions from controls with [sic]
the State proposed to place on both Addison and Washington in concert with the widening
process." 97 Idaho at 446 (emphasis added). In other words, the additional damages sought
were not claimed to arise from the physical take, but rather from the concurrent installation of "a
raised center-line median along Addison Avenue, which median would prohibit traffic on that
street from turning left across the flow of traffic at any point except at the street intersections."

Id. Dividing its discussion as to the compensability of damages resulting from the regulatory
taking as opposed to the compensability of damages resulting from the physical taking,
consistent with Covington, this Court declared: "The taking of defendants' property through the
process of eminent domain and the consequent damage to the remaining property had no
necessary relationship to the median construction." Id. at 447. The Court adopted the viewpoint
of the Indiana Supreme Court, in State v. Ensley, 240 Ind. 472, 164 N.E.2d 342 (Ind. 1960),
quoting: "The widening of the highway followed by its subsequent transformation into a
highway with a divider strip in the center, though contemporaneous with and part of the same
construction program, are separate improvements with respect to the appropriation of appellee's
property." 97 Idaho at 447.
Following its separation of the issues, as noted above, the Bastian court went on to
discuss the compensability of reduced access in the context of the defendants' specific claims for
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damages arising from the installation of the median. Id. Ultimately, the Court remanded the
case to the trial court with specific instruction to

mai~tain

a division and distinction between the

damages attributable to the physical taking versus the regulatory taking. Id. at 449.
As we have previously noted, however, the opinion testimony of
witnesses for Albertson's, Inc., in their estimate of damages
included those which might or would result from the above
mentioned traffic control device medians. Such elements of
damage may not be considered. Albertson's has and will retain the
burden of showing their damages resulting from the actual take and
the severance. State v. Dunclick, Inc., supra; State v. McGill, 79
Idaho 467, 321 P.2d 595, 73 A.L.R.2d 613 (1958). On retrial if
those expert witnesses cannot eliminate that portion of the
damages which is noncompensable, i. e., that portion resulting
from the establishment of traffic control medians, then and in that
event their testimony must be stricken and the jury advised to
disregard it in its entirety.

Id. In contrast, lTD would now have this Court blend back together the two issues separated in
Bastian so that its language can generically apply to the facts of this casco This attempt should
be rejected as inconsistent with the very authority on which ITD relies.
The cases relied upon by lTD to bolster its argument that Bastian should apply in this
case are, in reality, helpful to HI Boise. As the Indiana Supreme Court stated in State v. Kimco

of Evansville, Inc., cited by ITD on page 27 of its brief on appeal, "[l]egislatures may confer
greater rights to compensation for government action than those afforded by the constitutional
takings clauses." State v. Kimco of Evansville, Inc., 902 N.E.2d 206, 212 (Ind. 2009) (citing

Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 162 L.Ed.2d 439 (2005». The
Supreme Court of Indiana interpreted the Indiana business damages statute, much like the Idaho
law, as "provid[ing] the measure of damages from a taking of a property right. It does not create
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a right to compensation where no taking has occurred." Id.
triggers

applicatio~

The determinative aspect that

of the business damages statute in Indiana is the existence of a taking - the

same standard by which the Idaho law is applied. Compare 902 N.E.2d at 212, with I.C. § 7711. In Kimco, however, the damages claimed did not arise from a taking, but were instead the
product of a concurrent installation of a median traffic device. 902 N .E.2d at 212. In contrast, in
the instant case, it is undisputed that a taking has occurred, and that said taking has altered the
physical location of the access formerly enjoyed by HI Boise and has condemned HI Boise's
deeded right to access Vista Avenue. Accordingly, as is evident from Kimco, even under the
Indiana case law cited by lTD, HI Boise would be entitled to any and all business damages
arising from lTD's physical appropriation of HI Boise's property - both in terms of the real
property condemnation that has raised the access driveway and pushed it closer to the building,
and in terms of the elimination of the deeded access right.
Similarly, lTD's reliance on City ofJacksonville v. Twin Restaurants, Inc., 953 So.2d 720
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007), proves to be more consistent with HI Boise's position than with
lTD's. Though lTD describes Twin Restaurants as "a case that also involved a physical taking
of property," the reality of the case is that there were multiple takings alleged in that case, and
the court's attention - and decision - is directed solely to the non-physical, regulatory act of
installing a center-line median.

953 So.2d at 720 (holding that access damages solely

attributable to "a new median in Collins Road" were not compensable). That regulatory act was
undertaken concurrently with the road widening project that gave rise to the physical taking, and
was the sole source of the damages alleged by the condemnee. Id. Such is the same situation
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that was presented in Bastian, but is the opposite ofthe situation now before this Court, whereby
HI Boise seeks damages arising specifically from the physical taking of both its real property and
its deeded property rights.
The citation to Twin Restaurants further demonstrates ITD's inability to identify any case
law, in this state or any other, that stands for the proposition that a condemnee is not entitled to
access damages arising from an actual, physical taking.

Rather, in each of lTD's cases,

including Bastian, there are at least two separate takings at issue; the analysis cited by ITD from
each of its cases deals strictly and solely with the non-physical, regulatory taking at issue. Twin

Restaurants, as with Bastian, leaves ITD stretching to apply principles that were clearly limited
to the regulatory takings at issue in those cases to the physical taking giving rise to HI Boise's
present claims for damages. As previously stated, Covington prohibits such an approach, and
lTD's argument ought to therefore be rejected.

3.

Fonburg is relevant Idaho law for physical takings, and should be
applied in this case.

In this case, HI Boise has argued for the application of the well-established legal
precedent set forth in Fonburg and its progeny, that a party whose property has been physically
appropriated is entitled to damages from "all inconveniences resulting to the owner's remaining
land, including an easement or access to a road or right of way formerly enjoyed, which decrease
the value of the land retained by the owner." Fonburg, 80 Idaho at 278. lTD's response to the
relevance of Fonburg is misguided on a number of levels.
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First, ITD claims that HI Boise relies on a single, "isolated quote," which language is
"simply dicta."

(ITD Brief, p. 27-28.)

There is nothing in Fonburg to suggest that these

assertions are accurate. See generally, Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269. To the contrary, it is apparent
from the decision that several of the issues on appeal dealt with the propriety of certain jury
instructions. Id. at 278 ("The assignment of error dealing with instructions requested which were
not given and the alleged error in giving certain instructions will now be discussed .... "). The
language that HI Boise relies upon is taken from the Court's discussion of and its ultimate
rulings on those jury instructions, which ultimately conclude with its remand of the case for a
new trial to properly determine damages.

Among the discussion pertinent to proper jury

instructions on damages in condemnation cases. the Court found the following:
•

Where a part of the owner's contiguous land is taken in a
condemnation proceeding, all inconveniences resulting to the
owner's remaining land, including an easement or access to a road
or right of way formerly enjoyed, which decrease the value of the
land retained by the owner, are elements of severance damage for
which compensation should be paid. 80 Idaho at 278.

•

However, the instructions given to the jury contained no outline of
the elements of damages that the jury should consider. ... The jury
was nowhere in the instructions given advised as to the claimed
severance damages because of destroyed or curtailed access to
highway No. 95, as formerly enjoyed .... 80 Idaho at 278-279.

•

Accessibility to the railroad formerly enjoyed, which because of
the taking of a part of defendant's land, is limited and restricted,
thereby decreasing the value of the remainder, if it does, is an
element of severance damage to be submitted to and considered by
the jury. 80 Idaho at 279.

•

The court should have instructed the jury that the easement and
right of access, ingress and egress to highway No. 95 as formerly
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enjoyed, and curtailed in this proceeding, was an element of
damage to be considered by the jury .... 80 Idaho at 279.
•

We think the jury should have been instructed as to the elements of
damage claimed to have been suffered by defendant, and supported
by any proof, because of the taking of the land and the construction
of the improvement in the manner proposed. These elements of
damage consist of the reasonable market value of the land taken,
together with all improvements thereon located and taken in this
proceeding, severance damage to the remainder, . . . which
severance damage would include, among other damage sustained,
the curtailment and restriction of access to highway No. 95, as
formerly enjoyed, and access to the railroad as enjoyed prior to the
construction of the new road. 80 Idaho at 280.

•

The elements of damage which must be ascertained and assessed
are provided for in Sec. 7-711, 1. C. . .. ' If the property sought to
be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the
damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned, by reason of its severance from the portion sought to
be condemned, and the construction of the improvement in the
manner proposed by the plaintiff.' If such elements of damage are
supported by any substantial evidence, the jury should be advised
to consider the same in awarding damages. 80 Idaho at 280.

It is clear from the foregoing that the Fonburg Court was very insistent on the inclusion of

damages attendant to lost access in any final damage calculation, and that such insistence was
material to its decision and not "simply dicta." (Contra lTD's Brief, p. 28.) Moreover, it is
abundantly clear that lTD's assertion that "[t]he only claim the Idaho Supreme Court agreed with
... was that the jury should have been instructed on 'claimed severance damages because of
destroyed or curtailed access to highway No. 95, as formerly enjoyed," is inaccurate. (Compare
lTD's Brief, p. 29, with Fonburg).)
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lTD continues its discussion regarding Fonburg with a misleading and erroneous
statement about the facts of that case, in an attempt to distinguish those facts fr.om the facts of the
case at bar. (ITD Brief, p. 28.) ITD asserts, notably citing Fonburg's opening brief and not the
ultimate findings of either this Court or the trial court,

t~at

"the property owner was denied

access to the new highway and all access to the old highway was destroyed, leaving Fonburg
with no access." (lTD Brief, p. 28 (emphasis in original).) In contrast, the actual findings in

Fonburg clearly state: "Defendant will be prevented from crossing the new highway from his
land to the railroad, except by a circuitous route permissible at one point." Fonburg, 80 Idaho at
274. In other words, in a decision that is highly instructive for present purposes, the Court in

Fonburg did ultimately rule that the condemnee was entitled to present evidence to a jury that the
physical taking of the "the easement and right of access ... curtailed in this proceeding, was an
element of damage," despite the fact that, as here, another access point did in fact exist. ld. at
279. The equivalent situation presents here, and, thus, the same rules of law ought to apply.
lTD's efforts to distinguish Fonburg are simply misguided.

Continuing with the

aforementioned argument, whereby lTD erroneously asserts that the condemnee there was left
with "no access," lTD draws contrast with the present case by asserting that "no access is being
taken, closed, or restricted." (lTD Brief, p. 28.) As set forth above, this statement is in direct
contradiction with the district court's findings; whether an access right has been taken has been
reserved for trial: "the small movement of the driveway could constitute a taking." (R. at p.
001202.) HI Boise posits that the reason ITD disregards the district court's reservation of that
issue for trial is that it implicitly recognizes the substantial similarities between the instant case
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and Fonburg, as well as the inherent dilemma between the district court's reservation of the
access determination for trial and its

decisio~

to follow the regulatory takings precedent that does

not allow access damages for less than a complete destruction of access.
Moreover, FonburfJ was not an aberration in Idaho jurisprudence, as it merely follows the
statutory precedent established in Idaho Code § 7-711:
If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a
larger parcel: (a) the damages which will accrue to the portion not
sought to be condemned, by reason of its severance from the
portion sought to be condemned, and the construction of the
improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff; and (b) the
damages to any business qualifYing under this subsection having
more than five (5) years' standing which the taking of a portion of
the property and the construction of the improvement in the
manner proposed by the plaintiff may reasonably cause ....
I. C. § 7-711 (2). Between the controlling statutory and common law, then, it is evident that a
complete destruction of access is not required, in the context of a partial physical take, in order to
permit a jury to award damages to the condemnee based on lost or restricted access. Because the
facts of the instant case fall squarely within the scope of both Fonburg and Idaho's severance
and business damages statute, HI Boise is entitled to all severance and business damages that a
jury determines were caused by lTD's Project.
In truth, the only element of damage that the Fonburg court actually denied arose from an
issue that does not present in the instant litigation. 80 Idaho at 277. In Fonburg, an entirely
"new road" was constructed in a new location, and this Court correctly determined that "[t]here
is no inherent right of access to a newly relocated highway." Id.

Here, there is no "newly

relocated highway;" HI Boise's claim for access damages arises strictly from the loss of access
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and/or access rights to Vista Avenue, as "formerly enjoyed." Id. at 278. Though lTD attempts
to use

th~

portion of the Fonburg decision that denies those access damages, the facts of that

portion of the Fonburg decision truly are distinguishable. Unlike Fonburg, HI Boise has never
made a claim for lack of access to any roadway to which it did not previously enjoy access.
Furthermore, a complete reading of the material quoted by lTD in support of this argument
sustains HI Boise's position with regard to the premature determination of the district court on
the availability of severance damages relating to lost access rights. (Compare ITD's Brief, p. 29
with 80 Idaho at 277-278.) The last sentence ofthe paragraph block quoted on page 29 ofITD's

Brief, which sentence was omitted from lTD's reproduction, reads:

"There can only be

compensable damages for an existing easement, and when one does not exist, there is none to
take." 80 Idaho at 277-78. Thus, when an easement right is taken, compensation is required. Id.
As the district court reserved for trial any determination as to whether lTD has taken an
established or fixed access right of HI Boise (R. at p. 001202), it is incoherent that the Bastian
prohibition on access damages in the context of regulatory takings would control over the
rationale of Fonburg and the supportive application of I.e. § 7-711(2).
Finally, rather than arguing with the position actually advanced by HI Boise, that it is
entitled to "all reasonable damages arising out of the direct physical condemnation of its access
rights" (R. at p. 001685), ITD asserts, incorrectly, that HI Boise is seeking damages "barred by
Idaho law." (lTD's Brief, p. 30.) HI Boise's position centers around those aspects of severance
damages that are permissible, based on the historical jurisprudence on physical takings

not the

least of which is clearly set forth in Fonburg. While it may be true that a property owner who is
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the victim of a partial taking is not entitled to "all inconveniences resulting to

th~

... remaining

land," the relevant precedent establishes that the owner is entitled to all such inconveniences
"which decrease the value of the land retained by the owner." 80 Idaho at 278. It is on that basis
that the district court must be reversed.
It should be noted that the damages likely to flow from the destruction of a deeded access

easement are, in all probability, damages associated with reduced access. Keeping in mind that
the reservation of an access easement in the 1967 deeds is a property right, the condemnation of
which requires payment of just compensation, Coeur d'Alene Garbage Service v. City of Coeur

d'Alene, 114 Idaho 588, 591, 759 P.2d 879, 882 (1988), it is inconsistent with fundamental
constitutional principles to read Bastian as a boilerplate prohibition on claims for reduced access
in physical takings cases. In applying the Bastian standard to a case involving the physical
appropriation of a deeded easement area, a situation is created whereby the condemnation of a
compensable property right has no attendant, permissible damages. In other words, it forces a
scenario in which "private property [can] be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. Const. amend. V. This constitutional problem, endorsed by the district court, can only be
avoided by confirming that the Bastian holdings on access damages are limited to regulatory
takings, and that physical takings are decided consistent with Fonburg, I.C. § 7-711, and our
state and federal Constitutions.
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B.

HI Boise has Lost Access Rights and Convenience of Access, for which it is
Entitled to Compensation.

As HI Boise has brought this appeal under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure S4(b) and/or
Idaho Appellate Rule 12, there has not yet been a trial on the merits or any detailed factual
findings of the district court. The issues that HI Boise has presented on appeal stem from the
district court's decision on matters of law, including but not limited to the application of Bastian
to the instant case. As a result, many of the factual issues argued by lTD are not relevant for
purposes of this appeal, no matter how much emphasis ITD places on its characterization of the
facts. The district court simply did not find, as a matter of fact or law, that HI Boise had not lost
access as a result of the Project. (R. at pp. 001202-1203.)
Accordingly, lTD spends considerable time throughout its briefing attempting to argue
the merits of portions of this case that are yet undecided by the district court. (See, e.g., ITD's
Brief, pp. 33-37.) Though the district court expressly reserved the question of whether there had
been any taking of HI Boise's deeded access rights (R. at p. 001202), lTD would seemingly have
this Court simply make the necessary factual findings in its favor and then base its ruling on the
issues on appeal on those findings. (lTD's Brief, pp. 33-37.) Without having formally done so,
ITD appears to be cross-appealing the district court's refusal to rule as a matter of law that HI
Boise's deeded access rights are either unenforceable or otherwise invalid and thus is arguing a
set of issues on appeal that are entirely different than that which has actually been appealed by
HI Boise. This maneuver demonstrates lTD's discomfort with Fonburg, and its inability to
escape the necessary, legal and logical conclusion that the district court's refusal to allow

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 18

19106-002 (421826)

damages relating to access is entirely inconsistent with the prospect that a taking of HI Boise's
deeded access rights may have occurred.
First, ITD claims that the "deeded access right remains in full force and effect," asserting
that "ITO did not take, destroy, or extinguish an access right or easement." (lTD Brief, pp. 3334.) However, that is the exact issue that the district court reserved for trial: "if the access
granted by the reservations of rights had acquired a specific location through permitting or by
having been constructed by a government agency, the small movement of the driveway could
constitute a taking." (R. at p. 001202.) This holding was consistent with Dunclick, 77 Idaho 45,
286 P.2d 1112, which establishes that a condemning authority may not "force an exchange of
land," nor "require that [condemnees] ... move the [improvement], or any part of it, to a new
location." no matter how insignificant ITD believes or characterizes the movement to be. 77
Idaho at pp. 51-52.

The district court specifically found that "the issue of whether a specific

location has been fixed remains" (R. at p. 001202), so to the extent that ITD's argument is based
in whole or in part on an asserted conclusion to that issue, the same should be rejected on this
appeal.
Next, and in direct contradiction with its prior argument that the deeded access rights
"remain[] in full force and effect," ITD next asserts that there actually was no deeded access
right to be disturbed.

(lTD Brief, pp. 34-36.)

Citing as support State of Idaho, Idaho

Transportation Board v. Bradley B., LLC, and Dillon Limited Partnership, et aI., State of Idaho,
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, Case No. CV OC 08185194 ("Dillon"), the earlier district
court decision initially relied upon by HI Boise, lTD contends that "HI Boise never established
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its contractual right of access" because it never "applied for or obtained a permit for an access in
the area reserved in the 1967 deeds."

(ITO Brief, p. 35.) ITO's argument that it has not

condemned any access rights reserved by deed is, however, based on faulty premises. ITO, as it
did below, focuses on the lack of any "permit" issued by it or any other governmental agency,
which would have "perfected" the access easement set forth in the 1967 deed. (Jd. at 36; see also
R. at p. 000813.) In contrast, ITO contends, "the property owner [in Dillon] had obtained a

permit for the access, and thus had perfected its access right." (Jd.) Both before the district court
and now, ITO has argued that such a permit existed in Dillon, in order to factually distinguish the
Dillon analysis from present case. (Jd.) The problem with ITO's attempt to distinguish these

two cases, however, is that the distinguishing "permit" in Dillon does not actually exist; when
asked to produce the Dillon permit in discovery, ITO was unable to do so. (R. at p. 001652.)
According to ITO's own discovery responses, "ITO did not issue an access permit to Dennis
Dillon, and it does not believe that any other entity issued an access permit." (Jd.) ITO simply
has no factual basis to contend that the distinguishing factor in Dillon was the existence of a
permit.
Of greater importance is the fact that, regardless of whether HI Boise (or its predecessors
in interest) ever applied for or obtained a permit to perfect the location of the access according to
the 1967 deed, the history of the parties' conduct (even in altering that location over the years) is
sufficient to fix the location and HI Boise's rights:

"Where the grant or reservation of an

easement is general in its terms, an exercise of the right, with the acquiescence and consent of
both parties in a particular course or manner, fixes the right and limits it to that particular course
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or manner." 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements § 72, cited in Dillon (R. at. P. 000640). In reserving for
trial the que?tion of whether the access location had been fixed, the district court recognized that
there are means by which HI Boise's deeded access right may be perfected without an actual
permit.

(R. at p. 001202.)

Regardless of the fact that the parties, or their respective

predecessors, have mutually acquiesced to a prior alteration of the exact location of the driveway
access, the facts of this case demonstrate that all have conducted themselves in agreement with
the specific location of the access, within the deeded easement area, since at least 1972. (R. at p.
000966.) In contrast, the current Project involves a nonconsensual movement of the access in
three directions - east toward the buildings on the property; south toward the new overpass; and
raised to accommodate the altered grade of the new overpass approach. (R. at pp. 000587-98;
000839.)
The inescapable truth is that there still remains a question for trial as to whether HI
Boise's access to its property has been reduced or inconveniently altered in such a way that has
caused a reduction in the Property's value. If that access has been adversely affected, HI Boise
is entitled to an award of damages for that alteration, based on the fact that the alteration is a
direct product of a physical appropriation of its Property by ITO. Fonburg, supra.
C.

HI Boise is Entitled to Compensation for any Reduction in Value of the
Property Caused by Reduced Visibility.

Below, the district court addressed HI Boise's claim for damages due to lost visibility
both as a claim for inverse condemnation and as a claim for severance damages associated with
the partial physical appropriation of HI Boise's property. (R. at p. 00 1970,
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found that "[t]he structures and improvements that HI Boise contends obstruct its visibility
include the overpass

~tructure

and the corresponding exit ramps, which structures and

improvements necessitated the widening and raising of the Vista Avenue right-of-way." (R. at p.
00197.5,

~

14.) Further, "it is undisputed that the Vista Avenue right-of-way, both abutting and

including the property taken from HI Boise, is being widened and raised to accommodate and
enable the construction of the Vista Avenue overpass extending across Interstate 84, as such

widening and raising was integral to the completion and usefulness of the Project."

(Id.

(emphasis added).) Simply stated, if the overpass is a table, the property taken from HI Boise is
one of its legs: "a portion of the changes to Vista Avenue necessitated by the overpass are
located on property acquired from HI Boise." (R. at p. 001972, ~ 17.)
Based on the foregoing, and in consideration of the principles of law previously discussed
in this brief, HI Boise should be entitled to present and earn an award of damages associated with
any reduction in value to the property that results from the Project. Fonburg, supra. "This Court
has stated that private property 'of all classifications' may be taken for public use under the just
compensation clause. It is also established that the 'right to conduct a business is property. '"

Coeur D'Alene Garbage Serv., 114 Idaho at 591 (citing Hughes v. State, 80 Idaho 286, 328 P.2d
397 (1958); Robison v. H & R.E. Local # 782,35 Idaho 418,207 P. 132 (1922». As the Project
necessitated the taking of a portion of HI Boise's property, and the Project has resulted in
substantial inconveniences to HI Boise's right and ability to conduct its business on its property
by way of the loss of visibility it has suffered, HI Boise is entitled to damages associated with the
loss of visibility. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 278; see also I.C. § 7-71l(2)(b).
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In finding that HI Boise would be entitled to severance and/or business damages
associated with the partial taking caused by t~e Project, this Court would not be alone:
[C]ourts also have recognized a compensable visibility interest
when government action that includes a partial physical taking of a
landowner's property impairs the visibility of its remainder, as
seen from the adjacent road. (See, e.g., People v. Ricciardi, supra,
23 CaL2d at p. 399, 144 P.2d 799; People v. Loop, supra, 127
Cal.App.2d at p. 803, 274 P.2d 885; see also 8,960 Sq. Feet v.
Dept. of Transp. (Alaska 1991) 806 P.2d 843, 848; State v. Strom
(Minn.1992) 493 N.W.2d 554, 561; State v. Weiswasser (1997)
149 N.J. 320, 693 A.2d 864, 876; but see State v. Lavasek (1963)
73 N.M. 33, 385 P.2d 361, 364-365; State v. Schmidt (Tex. 1993)
867 S.W.2d 769, 774.) In these cases, the "right to be seen" bears
upon the value of the residual parcel. In other words, the
diminution of visibility in these circumstances does not, bv itself,
result in the taking or damaging of property, but once a physical
taking is established, such diminution is taken into account in
determining damages in a condemnation or inverse condemnation
proceeding.

Regency Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 39 Cal. 4th 507, 519-20, 139 P.3d 119, 126
(2006) (emphasis added). Just as with the access issue, then, the determinative factor triggering
the application of the law established both in Fonburg and I.e. § 7-711 was lTD's physical
appropriation of land owned by HI Boise. As such, HI Boise is entitled to business and/or
severance damages for the loss of visibility that it has suffered.
lTD attempts to liken HI Boise's claimed right of visibility to claims for rights to a
particular flow or pattern of traffic, which have been previously rejected by Idaho courts in
regulatory takings cases. (lTD's Brief, p. 41.) HI Boise responds by suggesting that the betterreasoned approach was articulated by the Supreme Court of California, under a similar statutory
scheme mandating damages to remainder property:
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The contention that the disputed elements of damage-the taking
or impairment of the right of direct access to the through highways
and the taking or impairment of the right, of visibility to and from
the one highway (Rosemend Boulevard) in relation to the
remaining property-are noncompensable as being the result of
police power regulation, cannot be sustained under the facts and
law applicable here. We recognize that the defendants have no
property right in any particular flow of traffic over the highway
adjacent to their property, but they do possess the right of direct
access to the through traffic highway and an easement of
reasonable view of their property from such highway. If traffic
normally flowing over that highway were re-routed or if another
highway were constructed which resulted in a substantial amount
of traffic being diverted from that through highway the value of
their property might thereby be diminished, but in such event
defendants would have no right to compensation by reason of such
re-routing or diversion of traffic. The re-routing or diversion of
traffic in such a case would be a mere police power regulation, or
the incidental result of a lawful act, and not the taking or damaging
of a property right. But here we do not have a mere re-routing or
diversion of traffic from the highway; we have, instead, a
substantial change in the highway itself in relation to the
defendants' property; i.e., are-routing of the highway in relation to
defendants' property rather than a mere re-routing of traffic in
relation to the highway. Defendants' private property rights in and
to that highway are to be taken and damaged. It is only for such
private property rights that compensation has been assessed. The
court allowed no damages to be predicated on any diversion of
traffic from the highway but it did properly allow damages to be
based on diversion of the highway from direct access to
defendants' property.
People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390, 399, 144 P.2d 799, 803-04 (1943) (emphasis added). The

damages that will result to the remainder of the HI Boise property, including the loss of visibility
and the attendant business damages that such a loss will inflict, must be distinguished from a
mere loss of traffic and must be compensable in light ofIdaho's business damages statute. I.C. §
7-711(2)(b).
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III. CONCLUSION
The issues in this appeal are straightforward, and are primarily legal questions concerning
the application of this Court's precedent to cases involving partial physical takings. By contrast,
the fact-intensive versions of the issues, as articul.ated by lTD (lTD's Brief, pp. 11-12), are not
ripe for appeal as the district court has yet to make the factual findings that would give rise to an
appeal on those issues. Instead, this Court need only determine the scope and application of the

Fonburg and Bastian decisions, as they apply separately to physical and regulatory takings cases.
Because lTD has attempted to conflate the Bastian holdings regarding the distinct forms of
takings, and because both Fonburg and the Idaho business damages statute establish a consistent
and well-reasoned approach to awarding compensable damages in physical takings cases, the
district court's decisions to refuse damages based on lost access and visibility ought to be
reversed. To avoid overruling both Fonburg and Covington, as well as significantly altering the
meaning ofldaho Code § 7-711, HI Boise respectfully urges this Court to decide this case in the
manner suggested by HI Boise, thereby upholding (with clarification) all prior decisions of this
Court, remanding this case to the trial stage with instruction to permit evidence of damages
resulting from lost access and visibility, and awarding such other relief as the Court d,eems just
and proper.
II
II
II
II
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